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Introduction 
 Nestled in the hills of Sarajevo, just a short walk from the US embassy and the Bosnia 
Herzegovina Parliament, is a haunting sight. It is the stadium, or more accurately the remnants of 
the stadium, which held the opening ceremonies of the 1984 Winter Olympics. One would 
expect the former Olympic stadium to be well preserved and a point of pride for the city. 
Stadiums of past Olympics in cities such as Los Angeles, London, and Beijing certainly are. 
However, the stadium in Sarajevo consists of crumbling graffiti covered remains and 
gravestones. The gravestones serve as a continued reminder of the destruction and chaos caused 
by the siege of Sarajevo and the great loss of life as Serb forces held the city under siege for 
close to three years. During the siege, the city became an epicenter for conflict as Serb forces 
surrounded it and terrorized the majority Bosniak population. It was a four-year war during 
which civilians, rather than soldiers, suffered most of the casualties.  
 The ethnic conflict that engulfed the city, and more broadly the country, seemed to arise 
unexpectedly. Less than a decade previously, Yugoslavia had hosted the Olympic Games and 
been an example of multiethnic living. However, nationalist narratives spread by political elites 
and nationalist media sources emerged that called for ethnic exclusion and violent nationalism 
that ultimately destroyed Yugoslavia. Elites used these narratives as a way to remobilize and 
manipulate past stories to influence actions in the present. For instance, the practice by the 
Ustashe of targeting pregnant Serb women to “kill the seed” was used as justification for the rape 
camps set up by Serbian forces who were “replanting the seed” that had been destroyed a 
generation prior. Why were people so willing to accept these nationalist narratives? How were 
these narratives able to inspire individuals to embrace a sense of ethnic exclusion and to work 
outside of the state structure to take up arms against their fellow citizens? 
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Explanations for nationalism and its increased support within a society are numerous. 
Some observers point to the breakup of the Soviet Union and the subsequent unbalancing of 
Yugoslavia’s position in the world as a reason for the violence.1 Other scholars contend that the 
area was predestined to experience violent conflict due to the presence of ancient historical 
hatred between Croats, Serbs, and Bosniaks.2 Still other academics argue that the war was the 
result of purposely-constructed nationalism that leaders, such as Franjo Tudjman and Slobodan 
Milosevic, used as a way to cement their own power and distract public attention from economic 
woes.3 However, few of these scholars can explain the rapid rise of nationalism and move 
towards violence that took place in only a few years. None of these explanations for nationalism 
have studied the reasons for why individuals act on nationalist beliefs. Most simply take for 
granted the presence of a national identity other than Yugoslav. However, understanding why the 
public embraced nationalism so quickly is essential for understanding ethnic conflict. Situations 
of conflict can be better predicted or monitored if the role of timing is understood. The 
international community can take greater steps toward preventing ethnic and religious conflict if 
there is a better understanding of how normal national pride, such as singing the American 
anthem before sporting events, transitions into nationalist narratives calling for violence.  
In this research project, I ask why nationalism rose so quickly in Bosnia Herzegovina. 
My research focuses on the period from 1989, the beginning of the collapse of the former 
Yugoslavia, through 1992, the onset of the war in Bosnia Herzegovina. I examine two 
independent variables as possible explanations for why ethnic nationalism was able to gain such 
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  Veljko	  Vujačić,	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  Yugoslavia,	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Serbia	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  Croatia	  in	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  Social	  Construction	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strong support during the period: media manipulation and activation by elites and economic 
inequalities that led to scapegoating. To test the first independent variable, I explore how ethnic 
elites purposely created and disseminated nationalist narratives through media to serve their own 
political ends. For the second independent variable, I examine the effects of the economic 
upheaval Yugoslavia experienced and the impact of scapegoating on the acceptance of 
nationalist narratives. I also test if it is necessary that both independent variables be present in 
order for the rise to occur. 
Through gaining a better understanding of what led to the rise of nationalism within 
Bosnia Herzegovina and an examination of potential climates that increase public’s 
receptiveness of nationalist narratives, the international community could take important steps to 
create more effective conflict prevention measures and policies for dealing with ethnic conflict.  
Preview: 
 My project begins with a review of the literature relevant to my research. I first present 
important definitions and explanations of concepts that are the foundation of my research: nation, 
nationalism, and national narratives. I then focus on how scholars have previously explained the 
rise of nationalism. Based on the existing literature, I propose three hypotheses to explain a rapid 
rise in nationalism. My first hypothesis (H1) is that elite manipulation of the media was the 
crucial component for the spread of nationalism through nationalist narratives. My second 
hypothesis (H2) is that economic grievances led to the rapid rise of nationalism. My third 
hypothesis (H3) is that both the impact of the media and economic decline were necessary 
conditions for the rapid rise of nationalism.  
 I then outline my methodology that relies primarily on a qualitative approach. Using field 
interviews collected throughout Bosnia Herzegovina from all three ethnic groups during the 
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summer of 2013, the limited economic records from the period, and a variety of domestic and 
international press coverage of the time, I examine the understanding of the situation from an 
individual level. I do this in an attempt to see what inspired in people to adopt such abrupt shifts 
in ideology and transition away from living in multiethnic society. Pride in one’s nation was not 
the sole focus of the new nationalist sentiments that emerged. The narratives were extremely 
violent and exclusive in nature and demanded the separation from and elimination of groups that 
had lived together for generations. I assess my proposed hypotheses to see which variables 
played a larger role in the rapid rise of nationalism. Finally, I discuss the larger theoretical and 
policy implications of the rise of nationalism. 
Literature Review 
 I begin by defining and explaining the concepts of nation, nationalism, national identity, 
and nationalist narratives. With that foundation laid, I look to the explanations for why 
nationalism arises. The literature exploring the role of the media and narratives is presented first. 
I then present the literature surrounding the role of economics. I conclude with an examination of 
literature arguing for a multivariable explanation. Through the presentation of these ideas, the 
major explanations for the rise of nationalism are presented and explained as well as the 
possibility for a combination of are variables necessary to explain the rise. 
Nation, Nationalism and National Identity 
 At its heart, my research explores how violent nationalism arises. What makes people 
pick up arms and fight against people who had been their neighbors and friends? Why do they 
feel this is necessary? How is nationalism a step beyond belief in one’s nation? I attempt to 
understand the evolution of national identity to nationalism to violence. 
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 Ernest Gellner contends that a nation is “a group that wills itself to persist as a 
community.”4 His definition of nation indicates a number of things. Nations are not things that 
found around the globe organically. Borders and capitals do not just appear on maps. Under 
Gellner’s definition, a nation is not a passive identity; it requires agency. Individuals provide this 
agency by actively adopting and promoting their nation. They (the individuals who subscribe to a 
nation) unite under a cause of nationhood and ensure through their efforts that the nation 
continues to exist. This definition also suggests that the many of the concepts people prescribe to 
nationhood, such as a common history, religion, law, culture, do not have to all be present. What 
binds a nation is simply the perception of unity as a nation. As Benedict Anderson phrases it, 
nations are “imagined communities.”5 One way in which this perception of unity is achieved is 
through the use of the media.6  
Anderson pays particular attention to the impact of print media, beginning with the 
advent of the printing press, on the development of nationhood. He contends that the birth of the 
modern nation was only made possible because of the development of printing.7 The 
development of printing aided the sense of nationhood and nationalism in three main ways. First, 
print media created a unified field for the exchange of information and ideas below Latin8 and 
above spoken vernaculars9. Second, it gave a sense of “fixity” or rigidity to language that in time 
nations would use to appeal to a sense of ancient unity through a common language.10 Third, 
print media created “languages of power” or languages the dominated over the languages of 
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  Ernest	  Gellner,	  Nations	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  Oxford:	  Blackwell	  Press	  (1983),	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5	  Benedict	  Anderson,	  Imagined	  Communities,	  New	  York:	  Verso	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other groups.11 Through these three developments the ideas of what a nation could be spread 
throughout regions, and groups were able to unite behind the idea of a nation which previously 
could not have existed. 
 Simply having a nation does not imply nationalism, particularly violent nationalism. 
Nationalism takes the concept of a nation a step beyond a simple state of being. As Hans Kohn 
argued, nationalism is “a state of mind and an act of consciousness.”12 Kohn built his definition 
after examining the world in the waning days of WWII. Like nation, nationalism has a necessary 
agency component. It needs to be created and spread throughout a community by individuals. It 
is not something that is innate to humans. Individuals are not born nationalistic rather they 
become nationalistic; it requires creation. Nationalism usually functions as a way to link together 
a sense of national identity to a prescribed territory. An example of this sense of nationalism 
could be Crimea, currently part of Russian territory but previously part of Ukraine. Crimea has 
historic ties to Russia; nevertheless, for generations these ties were part of a collective history, 
although they were not a way to demonstrate the necessity of Crimea to be part of Russia. 
However, through recent events, a sense of nationalism developed amongst Crimeans that they 
should be a part of Russia, and as a result they made a concerted effort (or an act of conscious as 
Kohn would phrase it) to become part of Russia. They linked their sense of national identity, 
Russian, to a territory. Nationalism also takes on an exclusionary component. It is determined as 
much by what it is not as by what it is.13 It tends to stress a sense of national superiority and 
takes pride in being different from other nations. 
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  The	  Idea	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  Study	  in	  its	  Origins	  and	  Background,	  New	  York:	  Transaction	  Publishers,	  
(1944),	  10.	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  Andrew	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  Russo,	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  Patricia	  Yaeger,	  "Introduction,"	  in	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  et	  al.	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Nationalisms	  and	  Sexualities	  (New	  York,	  1992),	  5.	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One way that nationalism develops is through nationalist narratives. Gerald Cromer 
describes these narratives “projective narratives14.” Projective narratives are stories that recall the 
past, but also teach how to behave in the present. These narratives rely upon using the history of 
a group and the heroes of the past as a rallying cry for action in the present day.  They also can 
stress ideas of past victimhood and incite calls for modern day vengeance. They not only portray 
the past but also influence actions in the present, and they make behavior that should be criminal, 
such as killing or looting, permissible.15 An example of this is the manipulation of Jewish history 
by groups such as Haganah, Etzel, and Lehi. By using stories of the Jewish sufferings at the 
hands of the Greeks and Egyptians, extremist groups were able to demonstrate how their actions 
against the British fit a similar mold. As a result, they were justified in their use of violence 
against the British.16 Nationalist narratives are also used as a way to establish the ideas of “us” 
and “them.”17 Through this establishment of who is part of a nation and who is an outsider, the 
authors of the narrative create a sense of exclusion that can be used to further support calls for 
territory.  
 Both nation and nationalism require an agency component. As a result, nationalism 
cannot arise without some cause for it, more specifically elites or powerful individuals spreading 
nationalism. Two possible triggers nationalism could be the role of elites in manipulating the 
media or public frustration resulting from economic decline.  
Role of the Media  
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 Amongst the scholarly community, and the wider popular press, there has been a great 
deal of discussion about the role of the media and ethnic violence. Strong support comes from 
the example of the role of the radio in Rwanda. Researchers have used phrases such as 
“broadcasting genocide,” “death by radio,” and “voice of genocide” to describe the role of the 
radio18 and the radio “had large scale and direct effects on behavior.”19 There are two main ideas. 
First, the radio was a tool to implant listeners with ideas of hate, fear, and dehumanization 
towards the Tutsis. Second, elites used the radio as a way to create and distribute a voice of the 
conflict that could issue the orders to kill and the Rwandans chose to obey.20  
Lee Ann Fuiji’s study of the Rwandan genocide also offers insight into the role of the 
radio. Fuiji examined the radio as the voice of the ethnic cleansing. Leaders used the radio to 
spread messages of ethnic hatred, orchestrate attacks, and to give locations for where Tutsis 
were. According to Fuiji, the genocide in Rwanda would have been almost impossible to carry 
out to the same degree if not for the genocidaires’ use of the radio.21  The findings that leaders 
have used the media to inspire, orchestrate, and perpetuate ethnic conflict demonstrates the 
necessity of the media in spurring an increase in nationalism. 
Samantha Powers places a similar emphasis on the role of the radio in orchestrating 
conflict. Like Fuiji, Powers’ examination of the role of the media, in particular the radio, draws 
upon her research of the Rwandan genocide. She uses dozens of interviews, from both US 
officials and Rwandan citizens, and an examination of formerly classified documents concerning 
the events and the operations to develop her explanation. She cites examples of killers carrying 
out their acts with a radio in one hand and a machete in the other. The radio was a way for 
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19	  Straus,	  612.	  
20	  Straus,	  613.	  
21	  Lee	  Ann	  Fuiji,	  Killing	  Neighbors:	  Webs	  of	  Violence	  in	  Rwanda,	  Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  (2009).	  	  
9	  
	  
extremists to spread messages of hate in the build up to the conflict.22 Once the conflict began, 
elites used the radio to broadcast the location of targets, orchestrate attacks, and coordinate 
missions. In Power’s assessment, without the radio, the violence of Rwanda would not have been 
possible on the same scale. 
Not everyone is in agreement with Powers, Melvern, and Fuiji about the necessity of the 
media in sparking nationalism. Examining Fuiji’s work, Scott Straus contends that media is not 
the only necessary component and that labeling it as such oversimplifies the issues. Through an 
examination of the exposure of RTLM broadcasts, the content analysis of broadcasts, and 
interviews with individuals about the role of the radio in their decisions to commit violence 
within Rwanda, he argues that the existing belief amongst scholars is overly simplified and 
unsupported. Straus admits that the media did play some role, but that it cannot explain the 
ethnic conflict in its entirety. Focusing on the media fails to provide an agency component. He 
contends that scholars need to pay closer attention to “issues of agency, context, institutions, and 
history.”23  Rather, Straus contends that greater emphasis and study needs to be placed on the 
agency of Rwandans themselves and an understanding of the greater context of what was 
occurring in Rwanda.24  
Economic Grievance  
 Decremental deprivation caused by economic woes is another potential explanation for 
the rapid growth of nationalism. Ted Robert Gurr uses this concept to refer to situations in which 
economic production and strength decline, but the public’s expectations for things such as public 
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services, jobs, and prices do not. The result of this deprivation is intense frustration on the part of 
the public and an increased propensity for violence.25 Gurr bases his arguments on an extensive 
examination of over 160 conflicts, particularly civil wars and rebellions that have occurred 
within the past 200 years.26 He also draws heavily upon the work of psychologists in order to 
understand the personal motivations that inspire individuals to rebel. Gurr argues that individuals 
who are discontented are more likely to be anxious about social climate and have an increased 
susceptibility to radical ideological shifts.27 By contrast, this same propensity for violence is not 
usually seen when people are economically satisfied and that the economy is able to meet their 
expectations. This discontent could lead to strong calls for nationalism as well as increase 
susceptibility of the public to create scapegoats of ethnic groups perceived to be benefitting from 
the declining economic situations.28 
 Scholars have applied the idea of decremental deprivation to a wide number of political 
shifts, such as the Color Revolutions in post-Soviet states. Through an in-depth examination of 
the revolutions that occurred in Ukraine, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, 
Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Russia, Turkey, and China, Lane analyzed the GDP of each country 
compared to the Human Development Index, as a measure of national wellbeing.29 Lane notes 
that in all but China and Belarus, the economic situations, and as a result the social condition of 
the societies, were declining markedly in the lead up to revolutions. These declines led to a 
weakening of loyalty to the established governments and a decrease in trust.30 He demonstrates 
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  Boulder:	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  Press	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  Gurr,	  197-­‐198.	  
28	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  Revolutions’	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an important correlation between economic issues and a propensity for protest and calls for 
governmental change.31  
Media and Economic Woes Necessary 
Throughout the literature focused on explaining the rise of nationalism, numerous studies 
support a multivariable explanation. One such idea is that there is a bottom up explanation, as 
suggested by Daniel Goldhagen. This school of thought argues that ethnic division occurs 
because it finds receptive public support. It focuses upon three main premises. First, a leader 
initiates and spreads the principle or ideology that justifies the ethnic conflict, or genocide. 
Second, the citizens make a conscious choice to participate. Finally, those who have the power to 
prevent the violence do not step in to stop it.32 In its simplest form, nationalist violence is the 
result of hate models spread at the grassroots level.33 The animosity towards a group is reflected 
at all levels and leaders of ethnic conflict are simply mirroring and putting into action attitudes 
that the populace already holds. The major support for Goldhagen’s position stems from his 
study of Germany during World War II. He observed strong anti-Semitism in society (due 
largely to the perception that Jews were to blame for the economic struggle Germany was 
experiencing) and argued that it was this hatred that led average German citizens to carry out 
atrocities as part of the “Final Solution.” Within this framework, the public does not develop 
violent nationalist sentiments because they hear them expressed by leaders or in the media. 
Rather the public already has a sentiment against specific groups and willingly choose to follow 
leaders who promote and expound those sentiments. 
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 In cases other than Germany, both economic tensions and narratives are necessary to 
incite violent nationalism as well. Through his examination of conflict in Nazi Germany, 
Rwanda, and Yugoslavia, Peter Zvagulis found similar preconditions in each conflict. Based on 
an in-depth examination of events leading up to the eruption of conflict, Zvagulis notes that in all 
three cases there was a preexisting condition of economic crisis and a history of ethnic tension. 
Those in political power used the media to draw upon these ethnic tensions to bolster tensions 
between groups. Weakness within the political structure and the presence of a power struggle 
among elites exacerbate these issues.34 Building upon these findings, Zvagulis argues that 
political figures seek to control the media and use it to create scapegoats in situations of 
heightened collective frustration, such as economic crisis or political upheaval.35 Much like 
Goldhagen, Zvagulis’ analysis indicates that ethnic conflict is not due to the presence of just 
nationalist media or economic woes. Rather it is a combination of both that incites conflict.  
Independent Variable Corresponding Hypothesis 
Media Manipulation Elite efforts to use media to spread 
manipulated nationalist narratives 
Perception of Economy Perceived economic woes along national lines 
led the scapegoating of other groups 
Media/Economy Hybrid Economic woes made the public receptive to 
an ideological shift which was provided by 
the elite manipulation and use of nationalist 
narratives spread through the media 
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Research Design 
Dependent Variable 
 The dependent variable in this puzzle focuses exclusively on the rise of nationalism 
between 1989 and 1992 within Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nationalism includes the rise of calls 
for independence amongst the various Yugoslav states, such as Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Serbia, etc, as well as exclusionary nationalism that spread throughout the region.36 I study 
nationalism through the proxy of nationalist narratives. A shift in nationalist narratives from 
celebrating the multi-ethnic society of Yugoslavia to narratives focused on violence and 
exclusionary policies are indicative of the rise of nationalism. The public speeches of Slobodan 
Milosevic provide examples of these narratives. At the beginning of his career, Milosevic was a 
member of the communist party in Yugoslavia. However, during the time covered in this 
research, there is a marked shift in his speeches, which call for the Serb people to unite in their 
homeland and demonize other ethnic groups.  Through focusing solely on the rise of nationalism, 
I can explore an area of the conflict that has received little attention and test which mechanism 
best explains how nationalism rises out of regions that previously had had few calls for exclusion 
and violence based solely on ethnicity.  
Independent Variables 
In order to test my three hypotheses, I look at two independent variables. The first is the role of 
the media. The second is economic woes. Finally, I examine whether both variables must be 
present to explain the outcome. 
 The first independent variable is the role of elite manipulation of the media. I measure 
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this variable through an examination of press coverage within Bosnia Herzegovina and the 
surrounding area, particularly Croatia and Serbia. The reason for including media sources 
beyond just Bosnia Herzegovina is due to the substantial readership newspapers from throughout 
the region had within the country as well as the power of Milosevic and Tudjman’s radio 
addresses, which were broadcast throughout all of Yugoslavia. My examination of the media 
includes analysis of the growth of nationalist press and its readership numbers leading up to 
1992, which would be indicative of increased nationalist sentiment. I also explore the use of 
nationalist narratives within radio, television, and newspaper by key political elites. The use of 
nationalist narratives, their focus, and their change from 1989 to 1992, help to demonstrate how 
or if nationalist sentiments rose during the period.  
The second independent variable is economic woes. I measure the potential impact of 
economics on the rise of nationalism in a number of ways. I examine quantitative data such as 
the GDP, inflation rates, and the unemployment rates. If these factors demonstrate a substantial, 
downward change in the economic situation of individuals it would indicate the likeliness for 
increased economic frustration. This frustration, as was explained previously, could potentially 
be the cause of rise in nationalism as groups sought scapegoats for economic woes. The 
quantitative data is complemented by the qualitative data from individuals from Bosnia 
Herzegovina and their perception of the economic situation. If individuals felt that their economy 
was suffering and the government was not taking the necessary steps to alleviate the issues, than 
even if the numbers do not support this idea it would still indicate that perceived economic woes 
allowed nationalism to flourish.   
Hypotheses  
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 Based on the existing literature concerning the role of elite manipulation of the media, I 
hypothesize that: 
H1: Efforts by the elites to spread nationalist narratives through the media to led to the rise of 
nationalism. 
 In order for this hypothesis to hold true, I expect to see a marked increase in the number 
of nationalist focused newspapers. I also expect to see an increase in the use of nationalist 
narratives by political figures and references to historical tensions. Finally, I expect the responses 
of individuals interviewed to reference the media as one of the major causes for the increase in 
nationalism they experienced. I do not expect to encounter examples of other factors being 
responsible for the rise of nationalism, such as references to the economy.  
 Based on the literature surrounding the idea that economic woes can instigate an increase 
in nationalism, I hypothesize that: 
H2: The spread of economic woes along perceived ethnic lines led to the scapegoating of other 
ethnic groups resulting in an increase in nationalism. 
 Examining the rise of nationalism through this lens, I expect to see a downward trend in 
economic data. This trend can take the form of increasing levels of inflation, unemployment, 
monetary depreciation, etc. As a result of this downward trend, there should be an increase in the 
public’s frustration in regards to the economy and the presence of newspaper articles that either 
subtly or blatantly report on issue in terms of nationality, such as references to certain 
nationalities over others or portraying economic issues as impacting one group over another. The 
sentiments expressed by individuals I interviewed should mirror this frustration. I do not expect 
to see the manipulation of historical tensions within this hypothesis. 
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 My final hypothesis contends that both the elite manipulation of the media to spread 
nationalism and economic woes were necessary for nationalism to rise as quickly and strongly as 
it did amongst the Bosnia public.  
H3: The perceived economic woes made the public receptive the spread of nationalist narratives 
by political elites causing a rise in nationalism. 
 This hypothesis acknowledges that both the media shift and economic woes were 
necessary. If this hypothesis explains the outcome, there should be an increase in the spread of 
nationalism by elites through the media. In addition, a growing sense of economic frustration and 
lack of faith in the current government to fix the situation should be apparent. I also expect this 
hypothesis to help explain the timing of the rise of nationalism. Public frustrations with the 
economy should be a larger factor before the rise of nationalism comes through strongly and 
widespread amongst the masses.  When examining the evidence for this hypothesis I do not 
expect to see nationalism stressed prior to economic upheaval. 
Methodology 
 I test the three aforementioned hypotheses by examining the case of Bosnia Herzegovina 
between 1989 and 1992. Bosnia provides an ideal case study for my three hypotheses. In the 
build up to the war, Bosnia experienced a sharp rise in elite spread of nationalist ideas and a 
steady economic decline.  
 In order to examine my second hypothesis, concerning the impact of the economy, I use 
the available economic data to test the changes in the economy. Through comparing the changes 
in unemployment, government spending on public services, inflation rates, and GDP, I can 
examine if the economy suffered a significant downward shift from 1989 to 1992. If so, this 
would support of the idea that when there is increased economic frustration, populations are 
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more likely to become exclusionary of other groups, in this case other ethnic groups. I then 
compare my findings with what individuals within Bosnia Herzegovina reported as their reasons 
for accepting nationalism and narratives. Throughout my analysis of the impact of economics, I 
make extensive use of newspapers. I rely on both local as well as international papers. Through 
these papers I am able to gain an understanding of how individuals as well as the international 
community viewed the economic situation. 
 Significant amounts of my research are from field research collected throughout the 
summer of 2013. Over the period of 10 weeks, I conducted extensive, formal, IRB approved 
interviews with seven37 individuals from all three main ethnic groups within Bosnia 
Herzegovina, Serb, Bosniak and Croat. These individuals were from a variety of ages, and had 
various roles throughout the war. Some had been children during it, some had participated in it, 
and some had lost family members during the war (See Appendix 1). I asked participants the 
same series of questions dealing with the role of nationalist narratives, the spread of nationalist 
ideas, and their general perception of the years leading up to the war. From these responses, I 
gained an understanding of the public perception during the period, how, at an individual level, 
they encountered and understood national narratives, the role of the economy on daily life, and 
an idea of how individuals viewed the rise of nationalism. My interviews were not without 
limitation though. Unfortunately, I have a rather small sample size of formal interviews from 
which to draw upon and that is largest hindrance to my findings. In addition, many of the 
individuals I spoke with had ties to various liberal NGO’s throughout the country. As a result, 
their viewpoints were often more liberal than the general populace. 
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 Another major limitation facing my research is the amount of available data. For most of 
the period of my research, Bosnia Herzegovina did not exist as an independent country and its 
economic information was lumped in with that of all of Yugoslavia.  When data is available for 
just Bosnia Herzegovina it is limited. In addition, in the years directly preceding the war, the 
World Bank has no data on record for the country. As a result, most of my economic data comes 
from secondary sources who compiled their data from a collection of local newspapers during 
the period. In addition, due to Bosnia Herzegovina’s proximity and the interconnectedness of 
nationalism with Croatia and Serbia, it is impossible to study the impact of just Bosnian elites on 
the spread of nationalism. The spread of nationalism within Bosnia Herzegovina was not just 
Bosnian nationalism; it was also Serb and Croat nationalism that was spread by leaders in both 
Croatia and Serbia. However, I believe this is permissible given the fact that the nationalist calls 
coming from Croatia and Serbia had a significant impact on Bosnia Herzegovina, possibly more 
so than just the calls for nationalism coming from within Bosnia Herzegovina. Despite these 
limitations, my research retains the ability to offer important insight in the rise of nationalism.   
Contribution 
The contribution of my research extends beyond the boundaries of the Balkans. My work 
constitutes an attempt to explain the timing of the rise of nationalism. While many previous 
studies have demonstrated why nationalism rises, far fewer studies examine the timing of the rise 
of nationalism. In order for the international community to construct preventative policies 
concerning ethnic conflict (rather than just taking reactionary responses) understanding timing is 
essential. My research offers steps in the right direction for creating an understanding of how 
normal levels of nationalism shift to something that is dangerous. 
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 My research also is a retesting of Straus’ skepticism concerning the impact of the media 
on the conflict in Rwanda. If my research demonstrates that the spread of nationalist narratives 
and the calls to action by elites through nationalist publications was not enough to incite the 
violence, than Straus’ contentions against Fuiji, Powers, and others gains strength. Furthermore, 
I extend Gurr’s idea of decremental deprivation past its original applications. While the theory 
already has substantial support, if it explains the rise of nationalism in Bosnia it could provide 
the framework for more in-depth studies of public perceptions of the economy by future 
scholars.    
Through my research there is also the potential to improve international policies 
concerning genocide and to create more proactive policies in order to use the lessons from 
Bosnia Herzegovina to avoid a similar fate in countries such as Syria or other future conflicts. 
Given the current situation in Syria, there is a strong potential for the conflict to shift to one of 
ethnic slaughter if the opposition party gains power and seeks to incite the public against the 
Alawite community in Syria that is usually seen as benefitting from the Assad regime. If the 
international community is better able to monitor nationalist narrative and determine when the 
shift in these narratives indicates a strong chance of violence, it can take steps to mitigate at least 
one component of the bloodbath in Syria. Overall, my research offers insights that can improve 
the international community’s ability to prevent ethnic conflict and also retests some of the 
prominent explanations for nationalism within the scholarly community. 
Presentation of Evidence 
Nationalist Narratives and the Media 
 I first hypothesize that nationalism rose due to efforts by elites to use of the media to 
spread nationalist narratives. Under this explanation, the rise of nationalism was a direct result of 
the spread of nationalist ideas, particularly nationalist narratives. To examine this potential 
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explanation I rely upon an examination of the changes in newspapers over the time period, the 
focus of political elites’ speeches, and rely heavily upon the recollections of the subjects of my 
field study for their perception of the impact of the media on the emergence of national identities 
other than Yugoslav. From this data, I expect to find a significant increase in nationalist focused 
press, the spread of nationalist narratives by key political figures aimed at dividing the country, 
and a public perception of increase nationalism. 
During the buildup to the war, a strong nationalist focus press emerged, largely controlled 
by powerful elites throughout Yugoslavia. The country experienced an increase in 
republicanization of the press that resulted in a greater nationality specific readership of papers. 
This republicanization occurred as newspapers focused on the news and opinions of their 
particular republic of publication rather than on Yugoslavia as a whole.38 Figure 1 demonstrates 
the sizeable decrease in readership of major Yugoslav papers in the lead up to the war. Prior to 
the late 1980’s, many of these papers wrote for audiences across Yugoslavia, rather than having 
a particular nationalist bias.39 As Yugoslavia began to disintegrate, the media, particularly those 
that became tied with political elites, took on larger and larger nationalist biases. Individuals 
began to look more and more to local republic papers for news, rather than reading media 
sources from around the country.40  In 1989, a public opinion survey of the entirety of 
Yugoslavia was conducted by Borba, asking respondents which papers were most influential in 
the country, most respected, least respected, and read with the most frequency.41 The survey 
found that there was a close relationship between the republic of residence and newspaper 
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preference.42 For instance, in Bosnia Herzegovina local Muslims relied upon the Bonsian 
Republic Press (Oslobodjenje, AS). Croats turned to the press from the Croatian republic, mainly 
Vjesnik and Vecernji list. Serbs turned to Serbian Republic publications such as Politika.43  This 
shift in readership from Yugoslav focused papers to papers focusing on nationalist ideas and the 
use of the media by elites to spread these ideas demonstrates one of the major ways that elites 
used the media to gain support. 
The divergence in readership and in nationality-specific newspapers created a rift in 
multinational communication and fed into ideas of exclusivity. For instance, Serbian papers 
Politika and Politika Ekpres, two of the papers that maintained the highest readership, were 
instrumental in creating national tensions. Milosevic and his supporters used both of these papers 
to spread their ideas and create animosity against other ethnic groups. They spurred animosity 
amongst Serbs against Croatians for the supposed “theft” of Serbian factories and land. They 
created hatred for Kosovo’s Albanians for alleged acts of rape and arson against local Serbs. In 
addition, they demonized Tito and his call for “brotherhood and unity” throughout Yugoslavia.44  
Making use of extensive field studies conducted over a number of years, personal interviews, 
government documents, local and international newspapers, and countless other sources, Sabrina 
Ramet offers an essential overview of the situation in the lead up to the war throughout the 
republics. She goes so far as to argue, “that without the active participation of the press, the 
Serbian national movement could never have created the anger and resentment, which, in time, 
would drive the Serbs into battle against their erstwhile fellow Yugoslavs.”45 As the Yugoslav 
press suggests, the period of 1989 through 1992 was a time of increasing isolation between the 
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republics and increased nationalist sentiments. The media fragmentation also demonstrates a 
conscious choice on the part of the papers, mainly the elites who controlled them, to shift from a 
collective sense of being written for all of Yugoslavia to a focus on specific nationalities and 
regions. 
Figure 1: Yugoslav Newspapers with Circulations Larger than 10,000 in Rank Order 46 
 1983 Sales (number 
of copies) 
1990 Sales 
(number of copies) 
Percent 
Change in 
Sales 
Market 
Range 
Vecernje Novosti 
(Belgrade) 
339,859 222,282 93% 
decrease 
Originally 
read 
throughout 
country, 
then 
developed a 
Serb focus 
Vecernje list 
(Zagreb) 
309,839 221,942 28%  
decrease 
Croat focus 
Politika Ekpres 
(Belgrade) 
249,758 198,790 20% 
decrease 
Serb  
Politika (Belgrade) 243,826 184,551 24% 
decrease 
Milosevic 
controlled 
Slobodna  Dalmacija 
(Split) 
71,571 107,483 50% 
increase 
Yugoslav 
(was shut 
down by 
Tudjman) 
Druzina (Ljubljana, 
Catholic) 
n/a 100,000 n/a Catholic 
focus 
Glas Koncila 
(Zagreb, Catholic) 
n/a 100,000 n/a Catholic 
focus 
Delo (Ljubljana) 99,840 94,280 5.5% 
decrease 
Slovenia 
based 
Ognjisce (Koper, 
Catholic) 
80,000 n/a n/a Catholic 
focus 
Vjesnik (Zagreb) 73,030 74,563 2% increase Owned by 
Croatia and 
party 
controlled 
Sportske Novosti 
(Zagreb) 
141,247 70,597 50% 
decrease 
Yugoslav 
sports 
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Vecernje Novine 
(Sarajevo) 
35,049 66,911 91% 
increase 
unknown 
Novi List – Glas 
Istre (Rijeka) 
71,274 56,586 20% 
decrease 
Regional 
within 
Croatia 
Vecer (Maribor) 55,476 54,561 2% decrease Regional 
within 
Slovenia 
Mali Koncil (Zagreb, 
Catholic) 
50,000 n/a n/a Catholic 
youth 
Oslobodjenje 
(Sarajevo) 
71,557 47,690 33% 
decrease 
Bosniak 
focus 
Sport (Belgrade) 45,670 106,781 133% 
increase 
Serb 
focused 
(published 
in Cyrillic) 
Sportski Zurnal n/a 42,142 n/a Serb 
(Cyrillic) 
Dnevnik (Novi Sad) 34,158 39,677 16% 
increase 
Serb 
Borba (Belgrade) 30,976 31,408 1 % increase Yugoslav 
(Paper of the 
Communist 
League) 
Preporad (Sarajevo, 
Islamic) 
30,000 n/a n/a Muslim 
revival 
Nova Makedonija 
(Skopje) 
25,089 23,404 7% decrease Macedonia 
Vecer (Skopje) 31,959 22,948 28% 
decrease 
Unknown 
Pravoslavlje 
(Belgrade, 
Orthodox) 
22,000 n/a n/a Serb 
Magyar Szo (Novi 
Sad) 
26,485 20,708 22% 
decrease 
Marketed to 
Hungarian 
Serbs 
Pobjeda (Novi Sad) 20,073 19,570 2% decrease Unknown 
Glas Slavonije 26,485 12,349 53% 
decrease 
Croat 
Sources: Ramet, 40-41; Vecernje Novosti “About Us” 
http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=sr&u=http://www.novosti.rs/&prev=/search%3Fq%3DVe
rcernje%2BNovosti%26biw%3D667%26bih%3D614; the remaining sources on markets were taken from 
the Wikipedia pages of the respective newspapers as a result, their credibility cannot be verified.  
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The use of nationalist narratives by key political figures, and their spread through the 
media, indicates another form of media manipulation of the press. The political speeches of 
Slobodan Milosevic, Franjo Tudjman, and Alija Izetbegovic, each the president of Serbia, 
Croatia, and Bosnia Herzegovina, in their respective order, all stressed various forms of national 
identity amongst their respective ethnic groups.  
 Milosevic provides the best example of this. In Milosevic’s earliest speeches from the 
period, he stressed a strong sense of being Serb and a sense that being Serb created exclusivity 
from other Yugoslavs. This idea is most evident in his speech commemorating the Battle of 
Kosovo.47 Given in 1989, just at the beginning of the collapse of the Yugoslav system, Milosevic 
stresses and reawakens the idea of Serb nationalism. He draws upon the 600 years of Serbian 
history of “enslavement” following their defeat at the Battle of Kosovo. He goes on to stress the 
necessity for Serbs of unity to ensure a future, as well stating that war is not out of the question 
for ensuring the integrity of the Serb people. He also refers to the past victimhood the Serbs have 
suffered at the hands of the Croats, particularly he focuses on Croatian fascism during WWII. He 
concludes his speech with the oath “long live Serbia.48” This speech had far reaching impacts 
within the Serb community. It was heard in person by over one million individuals who were in 
attendance, as well as being broadcasted over the radio stations, and reprinted in newspapers 
throughout Yugoslavia.49 Some young Serbs could still repeat key parts of the speech over 20 
years later.50  
 The President of Croatia, and head of the majority political party Franjo Tudjman, also 
uses strong calls directed at the Croatian community. In his address to the “extraordinary” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  Slobodan	  Milosevic,	  “St.	  Vitus	  Day	  Speech,”	  June	  28,	  1989.	  
48	  Slobodan	  Milosevic,	  “St.	  Victus	  Day	  Speech,”	  June	  28,	  1989.	  
49	  Dr.	  Nick	  Hayes,	  interview,	  December	  13,	  2013.	  	  
50	  Interview	  1,	  6/22/13.	  
25	  
	  
session of the Croatian Assembly in August of 1990, he issued a kind of reminder to the Serbs of 
Croatia. He stated “the Serbs in Croatia must understand in their own interest that the Republic 
of Croatia is the republic and national sate of the Croatian people who seek within it their 
sovereignty and their equality.”51 He went on to elaborate that the Serbs in Croatia have 
benefitted from receiving services that “exceeded three, four, five, sixfold their share”52 under 
the Serb dominated national structure. Through the use and spread of these ideas, which were 
spread throughout local papers, Tudjman stressed to the Croatian people that it was in their best 
interest to unite under the idea of a Croatian state. He also subtly pointed out to the majority 
Croatian audience that the Serbs were unfairly benefitting from the Yugoslav services they 
received. At a time when Yugoslavia’s economy was in shambles and social services were very 
much needed, it is doubtful that this point was missed by the Croatian listeners. In addition, by 
referring to the population of Croatia, not all as Croatian, but with terms such as Serbs living in 
Croatia, Tudjman demonstrated that there was a difference between people and in a way 
indicated that the Serbs within Croatia somehow do not belong. While Tudjman’s speech was 
slightly more subtle than Milosevic, it was no less of a clear message of Croatian nationalism. 
 The President of Bosnia, Alija Izetbegovic, also stressed a sense of community and 
coming together amongst the Bosnaik community. However, his approach differed slightly from 
that of Milosevic and Tudjman in the stress he placed on religion, specifically Islam. The sense 
of a shared Muslim identity came out in a number of Izetbegovic’s speeches. For example, he 
referred to the Muslim community in his plea to the international community to help Bosnia in 
the wake of Croat and Serb aggression. He went so far as to chide the international community 
and question them if there inaction is “because the group of 1 million refugees who have crossed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  Franjo	  Tudjman,	  “Tudjman	  Addresses	  Assembly”,	  Zagreb	  Domestic	  Service	  in	  Serbo-­‐Croatian,	  August	  24,	  1990.	  
52	  Tudjman,	  “Tudjman	  Addresses	  Assembly.”	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Europe are Muslims and those who oppress them while they are running from the face of 
oppression are Christians?”53 He also routinely referred to the three groups that made up Bosnia 
as Croats, Serbs, and Muslims, rather than the term Bosniak. While I contend that Izetbegovic’s 
use of nationalist narratives was not nearly as strong or as violently inclined as that of Milosevic 
or Tudjman, the stress placed upon the divisions of religion was yet another way for elites to 
demonstrate the differences between the ethnic groups within Bosnia rather than their 
similarities.   
 These speeches helped to form the ideas of nationalism that became central within the 
region. More importantly their ability to be heard by sympathetic ears was crucial in furthering 
the spread of nationalist ideals throughout the region. 
 Due to the strong political control and pressure exerted over the media, many media 
sources had little option but to support these nationalist ideas. The largest paper in the country, 
Vercernje Novosti, centered in Belgrade, became one of the major mouthpieces of Milosevic’s 
calls for Serbian nationalism when he forcibly installed one of his political party members as the 
editor of the paper.54 The Vjesnik in Zagreb faced similar pressure given that the Croatian 
Democratic Union, a political party, owned it.55 Powerful politicians quickly destroyed papers 
that did work to remain a forum for open conversation from all sides. For instance the Split 
published paper, Slobodna Dalmacija, which experienced an increase in readership up until 
1990, was headed by a group of editors and journalists committed to running stories from all of 
the republics and relaying the facts, rather than national biases. However, President Tudjman 
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  Izetbegovic,	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  accessed	  March	  18,	  2014,	  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ve%C4%8Dernje_novosi.	  
55	  “Vjesnik,”	  accessed	  March	  18,	  2014,	  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vjesnik.	  
27	  
	  
shut the paper down for its efforts.56 Even individual journalists faced pressure to ascribe to the 
growing nationalist press. Reporters who broke rank were routinely beat up by local party thugs, 
were kept from covering stories that could be used for nationalist purposes, and some ended up 
permanently losing their positions as a result of their actions.57 
Even those who did not describe themselves as nationalists felt the pressure to redefine 
themselves because of the impact of the media. All of the individuals I spoke with described 
different experiences of their first time hearing of “nationalism,” but almost all of them, 
regardless of their respective nationality and location of growing up, cited the media as the first 
source from which they heard nationalist rhetoric emerge.  One woman recalls that “the only 
place I ever heard talk of nationalism was from the media, like the newspapers or the 
television.”58 Another tells of how she “never knew she was Bosniak and that others were Serbs 
or Croats”59 prior to the 1990s. In her memory, it was only once leaders like Milosevic came to 
power (which occurred in 1989) that the stories began. She phrased it as, “he won and then the 
stories started.”60 
Few individuals I interviewed had heard of nationalism or nationalists prior to 1990. 
When asked about her first experience with nationalism, the Croat woman61 said she had never 
heard of the word nationalist or nationalism until the summer of 1991 when she was 13. Growing 
up in a small town outside of Sarajevo, she cited the media as the major propellant for nationalist 
ideas or what she refers to as “the virus.” She remembered that it was through “political 
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advertisements and local papers”62 that elites spread these ideas. It was only after intensified 
media coverage of nationalist ideas that she saw her local community begin to “identify” and 
“divide” themselves. When asked if she believed the nationalist narratives to be responsible for 
the rise of nationalism and the eventual conflict, she responded with a resounding yes. The 
narratives caught on with individuals who began to believe the stories of ancient rights to land, 
victimization at the hands of other nationalities, and calls for vengeance.63 
 A Bosniak individual who grew up outside of Mostar, and fought on the Bosniak side to 
during the fight for Mostar, expressed a similar sentiment concerning the absence of nationalism 
prior to the 1990s. In his opinion “nationalism and the problems it caused, were produced.” Prior 
to the early 1990s he spoke of a Mostar and surrounding area in which people lived in peace 
together. However, nationalism began to appear from all different sources, including families, 
government officials, and the media, particularly from “the newspapers and publications in the 
region of what is now the Republic of Srpska.”64 Following this introduction there was a shift in 
daily life. People began to separate themselves by nationality when once they had a lived 
peacefully together. He contended, “politicians created nationalism as a way to divide us and to 
gain a greater number of votes.”65 Political elites spread messages that taught people if they did 
not vote for their respective nationality, then the other side would win and they would face 
destruction.66  
 Other respondents offered similar sentiments concerning the impact of the media and 
political elites on the spread of nationalism. Three women from Sarajevo, two which would be 
classified as Bosniak by society (they self-identified as Bosnian Herzegovinian) and a Serb, all 
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blamed the spread of nationalism on the intentional spread of nationalist narratives by political 
elites. A Bosniak women cited the spread of nationalist narratives by political figures as 
Yugoslavia began to crumble as a way to build political support for themselves. Both decried the 
fact that individuals were no longer able to refer to themselves as Yugoslav and instead had to 
identify with particular groups or face being ostracized from all sides.67 One Bosniak woman 
explained, “As Yugoslavia fell part, people began to have to delare themselves. My family said 
they were not religious and were just Communist. This was not acceptable to our community 
though. We faced suspicion from our neighbors because of it and had to declare as Bosniak, even 
though we were not religious.”68 The Serb woman presented the media as playing a more subtle 
role in the rise of nationalism then blatant calls. In her recollection, “the newspapers were biased 
in how they reported things. They took sides in descriptions of events. They made the Serbs out 
to be the bad guys in stories about Croatia and misreported events in Slovenia. It portrayed the 
Serbs unfairly”69 She herself described how the overwhelming power of nationalism within her 
community made her change from being a staunch supporter of Tito and a united Yugoslavia to 
having an intense hatred. She called nationalism “a weapon, as a way to do conflict.” As she 
said, “I don’t know why when I think back, but I hated anyone who was not Serb. . . all Serbs 
wanted to kill all Muslims and all Muslims wanted to kill all Serbs.” 70 
 As these individuals demonstrate, the intense rise of nationalism within Bosnia 
Herzegovina did not arise organically; rather it relied upon the manipulation of the public 
through the media. By presenting biased accounts of events, pandering to nationality specific 
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readerships, and creating a sense of fear for those who were not of the same nationality, the elites 
convinced the public that they had to divide themselves and align with their respective group.  
Individuals that chose not to align faced social exclusion and immense suspicion. This 
suspicion was felt from all nationalities, not just a specific group. For instance, a Bosniak 
woman’s family had never described themselves as Bosniak. They were not particularly 
religious, did not feel a relation towards the Muslim religion, and as a result did not self-define 
as Bosniak as many wanted them to. They classified themselves as Communist and thought 
nothing of nationality. However, in the lead up to the war, this classification became 
unacceptable in the eyes of their neighborhood community. In order to placate the community 
and ensure they were completely isolate, they acquiesced and identified themselves as Bosniak.71 
 The Serb woman faced a similar experience within her school community. She was a 
high school student during the war and attended a school composed of students of all three 
nationalities. In her recollection, nationality had never been an issue between classmates and was 
not something that was discussed or thought about. However, during class elections in the early 
1990s she recalled nationality becoming a factor in whom was elected to the board for a concert 
for peace effort.72 Her Serb classmates stressed the importance of having Serb students in 
leadership positions for event.73 This emphasis on nationality turned an event meant for peace 
into an example of the exclusion occurring between groups that had once been classmates and 
friends together. As these two events demonstrate, no longer could individuals pride themselves 
on being part of a multi-ethnic society, but felt forced to bend to societal pressure to identify with 
one of the respective nationalities. 
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 Political elites within Yugoslavia benefited from the manipulation of the media and 
spread of nationalist narratives. Political elites used nationalist narratives as a way to focus 
public attention on international aggressors rather than on the internal challenges facing the 
country.74 This idea finds clear support in Milosevic’s use of nationalist narratives to divert 
attention for the economic situation within Serbia. For example, during his national broadcast in 
1992, the interviewer asked him about the economic situation within Serbia. Rather than offering 
a direct answer to the question, he focused on the history of the Serb people as resilient and later 
goes on to discuss how Serbia was suffering from unfair international pressure and how the 
country must unite to avoid these threats.75 Nationalist narratives were also a way for politicians 
to give legitimacy to shaky claims of national identity.76 The stories these narratives spread 
created a sense of shared history and experiences, while also excluding groups that did not have 
the same history. They served as a way to create a sense of identity and to distract attention from 
other problems within society. 
 H1 offers a viable explanation for the creation and spread of nationalism throughout the 
Yugoslav states. The evidence demonstrates that there was a shift amongst the public towards 
newspapers that centered on nationalist ideas and a decrease in the readership of papers offering 
a more multi-ethnic viewpoint. In addition to the popular press, political figures laced their 
speeches with nationalist narratives that were violent and exclusionary. This emergence of 
nationalist calls created a pressure amongst the public to identify themselves as one nationality 
rather than supporting the multi-ethnic society of Yugoslavia.  Overall, H1 demonstrates how 
this shift occurred.  
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 H1 falls short explaining why people embraced these new calls for nationalism. It 
demonstrates what messages were present for the public to latch on to, but not why they felt a 
need to do so. Within Yugoslavia, there had always been recognition of the various ethnicities. 
Many people knew the variation between being Croat or Serb. However, they still embraced and 
supported the multi-ethnic society that Yugoslavia was. What changed? This is something that 
elite manipulation of the media alone is not able to explain. 
Economic Argument 
My second hypothesis is that economic woes led to social frustration and the 
scapegoating of other ethnic groups. To test this explanation, I examine the economic trends 
leading up to the onset of war, particularly the downward spiral of the economy and the inability 
of the populace to maintain their expected standards of living. The analysis of the economy relies 
primarily on evidence gathered from newspaper coverage during the time as well as individuals’ 
perceptions that I gathered during my field research. I expect to find that the economic woes of 
the times led to sentiments of frustration with the current political system and a susceptibility to 
ideological shifts resulting in the shift towards nationalism. 
The Economic Reality 
 Understanding the economic situation in 1988 is important for conceptualizing why such 
sudden economic shifts arose between 1989 and 1992. In 1988, the Yugoslavia economy was in 
shambles.  The economic system that Tito created failed as Yugoslavia’s position as the leader of 
the Non-Alignment Movement became increasingly obsolete and the economy of the country 
continued to decline. The public increasingly voiced complaints about the close relationships 
between politicians and enterprises. For example, the Agrokommerc scandal in Bosnia, in which 
a food enterprise wrote over $1 billion worth of IOUs to its 13,000 employees despite knowing 
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that it lacked sufficient funds to compensate its workers, led to widespread animosity and the 
trial of 25 individuals for “undermining the economic system” of Yugoslavia.77 The frustration 
surrounding corruption began to wear on the public. Mass protests broke out, such as the case in 
which 1,500 workers, primarily from the shoe and leather industry, stormed the federal 
parliament in Belgrade calling for the ouster of corrupt officials.78  The situation became even 
worse due to the skyrocketing inflation rate. In October of 1988, inflation reached a rate of 
236%, a new record for the country.79 To put this inflation in perspective, the prices of meat rose 
by as much as 53% and bread rose 60% within Serbia.80 In addition, the country was also facing 
foreign debt amounting to $21 billion and was struggling to ensure that the Soviet Union 
continued to pay Yugoslavia the $1.7 billion it owed.81 Due to these massive problems and the 
failure of past efforts, the Yugoslav government opted for a drastic change and began to shift to a 
more open market approach to the economy.  
 The shift to a market economy, beginning in 1989, led to one of largest shifts and 
continued economic declines in Yugoslavia’s history. The newly elected Prime Minister, Ante 
Markovic set a new economic course. In March, following a dismal February during which 
inflation reached 1,000%, Markovic declared that only through the deregulation of the economy 
could Yugoslavia hope to recover from its economic crisis.82 Within Yugoslavia, there was a 
dramatic upheaval as the state privatized companies failing to turn a profit and unemployment 
rose to a rate of 16%.83 To make matters even worse for the average citizen, the government 
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completed a redenomination of the dinar. In the course of less than one year, the dinar went from 
being 3,000 to the dollar to 28,900 to the dollar. The situation became so bad that Yugoslavia 
began to print a 500,000 dinar bill, which still was worth less than $17.84 The economic climate, 
including rising inflation and the devaluation of the currency, created a growing sense of 
frustration with the government’s inability to alleviate the situation.   
 The years that followed saw little improvement in the economic situation. In 1990, 
Yugoslavia’s businesses took yet another hit from international sanctions against Iraq, its largest 
third world trade partner. As a result of the sanctions, Yugoslavia lost $1.3 billion over the 
course of the year and an overall loss of $3.3 billion.85 In the same year, inflation rose to over 
2,000% and $17 billion in foreign debts. 86 As violence began to emerge in 1991, Yugoslavia 
also suffered a major decrease in tourism87, particularly along the Dalmatian coast, which 
previously had served as a vital revenue source for areas such as Croatia. Furthermore, the 
country’s foreign reserves fell from $10 billion to $2.7 billion in less than 13 months. Citizens 
also began to pay their bills in either “new” or “old” dinar.88 By 1992, it was clear that the civil 
war would spell economic doom for the country as newspapers declared that a quarter of the 23 
million Yugoslavia citizens lacked basic necessities and the economy showed no signs of 
recovering.89 
 The economic situation within Yugoslavia was dire. Between 1989 and 1992, the country 
experienced an abrupt shift, as attempts to create a more open market system led to mass layoffs 
and growing unemployment. In addition, the staggering inflation rates led to average citizens 
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seeing their livelihoods constantly decrease. The collapse of the dinar also led to lifelong savings 
suddenly becoming worth almost nothing as the cost of day-to-day necessities continued to 
skyrocket. Throughout the entire period, the joint Yugoslav government was able to do little 
more than continue to make promises of attempting to fix the economy but never being able to 
achieve actual results. The Yugoslav economy had a profoundly negative impact upon the 23 
million Yugoslav people.  
The Economic Perception 
 In order for the economy to play a decisive role in the rise of nationalism, it is necessary 
that the public perceive problems with the economy. Nationalism requires actors and voices in 
order to develop and become powerful, not just spiraling inflation.  
 The public’s perception of the economy was as dismal as the actual economic realities. 
International press coverage of the country makes multiple mentions of persistent strikes 
plaguing the country.90 The first major strike to receive international news coverage occurred 
outside the Parliament in Belgrade in 1988. The protest began with a focus on corruption but the 
protestors were not appeased by small actions and called on a nationwide strike in July of the 
same year.91 The protests continued as government action to quell the economic unrest failed.92 
This increasing persistency of strikes is one indicator of civil unrest amongst the population.93  
The printing of new currency also caused tension amongst the public. Under the new 
currency, “old” dinar became worth just 1/10,000 of “new” dinar.94 This effectively made the 
savings families had accumulated over their lifetimes worthless. This loss of wealth is an 
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additional reason for the public’s belief that the economy was causing them a great deal of strain. 
At the same time that money was becoming worthless, the price of goods continued to soar for 
the average citizen. As one woman discussed, “We eat only twice a day, mostly boiled potatoes, 
a very small amount of cheese and ham.”95 In addition, the average family income hovered 
around 14,000 dinar in 1992 leading up to the war. With this income, many goods remained far 
out of reach for individuals. A new pair of leather shoes cost 15,000 dinar (more than an entire 
month’s salary) and one kilogram of apples cost 300 dinars.96 Over a quarter of Yugoslavia’s 
citizens, close to 6 million people, were unable to provide for their own daily necessities.97  
Given the inability of individuals to continue the standard of living they had grown 
accustomed to, individuals began to look for scapegoats for their problems. As an individual I 
spoke with put it, “someone had to be to blame for the struggles were all having and the easiest 
to blame was other nationalities, or at least people thought it.”98 It is an exemplification of what 
Gurr finds with decremental deprivation that when a public becomes dissatisfied economically, 
they are willing to embrace ideological shifts and shifting societal identities, such as making 
scapegoats of those who they had previously considered friends and compatriots. Beginning in 
1989 a clear division amongst the nationalities emerged surrounding the Yugoslav economies. 
With the unveiling of the economic overhaul in 1989 also came the unveiling of a new 
government with only 19 rather than 29 ministers. The new Prime Minister, a Croatian politician, 
appointed his fellow Croatian politicians to the Finance Minister position and the head of the 
Development Ministry. Additionally, Croatian politicians who had been in office prior to the 
new Prime Minister retained their positions in positions such as Foreign Minister and Defense 
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Minister, despite the fact that many other politicians removed when the government was 
downsized. The Croatian-heavy emphasis on economic issues was not missed by the local press 
in their coverage of the event, as numerous newspaper articles made points of focusing on the 
nationality of the newly appointed ministers.99 As the years progressed, discussion of who 
dominated the economic situation continued.  In 1991, as Serbia began to stretch its military 
muscles, Leslie Gelb focused on the ethnic inequality within Yugoslavia, noting that 
“Yugoslavia is rife with economic inequality, with Serbs at the top of the food chain.”100  In few 
places was this dominance felt more strongly than within Bosnia Herzegovina. As a result of the 
Serbian economic blockade Bosnian industry was working at only 20% capacity in 1992, 
hundreds of thousands of workers were left with nothing to do, and food cost between 50 and 
300% more in Bosnia than in neighboring states.101This intense conflict or, perhaps more 
accurately, the perception amongst the public and the press of conflict, indicates a growing 
tension over the economy. In addition, the focus of the press and the portrayal of one nationality 
as being responsible for the state of the economy supports the idea that it was these economic 
woes that lead to the growth of nationalism within Bosnia Herzegovina. 
Impact of Economics on Nationalism 
 There are a number of reasons for why economic grievances could have been responsible 
for the rise of nationalism within Bosnia Herzegovina. Gurr’s idea of decremental deprivation 
provides a particularly insightful explanation for how the troubled economy could have led to the 
intensified sentiments. Bosnia provides a vivid example of several of these factors, in particular 
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the decline of production and an inability of political elites to resolve crises. The economy of 
Yugoslavia crumbled around the populace; however, their expectations for standards of living 
and government services did not. For instance, a Bosniak woman from Sarajevo discussed a deep 
sense of frustration that Yugoslavia scaled back their public services, such as healthcare, during 
the economic downturn. In her mind, that was the time the people needed these services the 
most.102 Even close to 20 years later, she bore resentment towards the Yugoslav government for 
not being able to provide for the people. In addition, not only was the government of Yugoslavia 
no longer able to provide for its people, but its people were no longer even able to retain what 
they had previously had, such as their life savings. It is little wonder that anger resulted. As Gurr 
puts it, “Men are likely to be more intensely angered when they lose what they have than when 
they lose hope of attaining what they do not yet have.”103 The citizens of the former Yugoslavia 
were angry, not because they had lost the hope of making money or of gaining from an improved 
economy, but because the gains they had already made and the savings they had amassed had 
been taken from them. 
Even the government admitted that they expected the public to be upset over the 
economic changes they instituted. With the economic overhaul launched in 1989, the 
government also called for the creation of social programs to help lessen the possible rise of 
social tensions.104 These programs were far from sufficient. The increased number of strikes that 
followed in the economic overhaul speaks to the inability of the social programs to appease the 
frustrated Yugoslav public.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102	  Interview	  
103	  Gurr,	  50.	  
104	  “Yugoslavia	  to	  Overhaul	  Crisis	  Ridden	  Economy”,	  Australian	  Financial	  Review,	  Octover,	  31,	  1988,	  42.	  
39	  
	  
Economic frustration also makes individuals more susceptible to radical ideological shifts 
and a propensity for violence.105 Due to the harshness of the Serbian trade embargo, individuals 
in Bosnia Herzegovina were unable to provide for their basic needs, maintain their usual 
lifestyles, and their government became unable to provide the services expected, which resulted 
in rising public animosity. This could have made them more easily susceptible to ideas of 
nationalism. The intense stratification between Serbs and Croats could have been due to the 
media portrayal that the economic overhaul, which failed, was the brainchild of Croatian 
officials. In addition, it was the fault of the Serbian policies that prices of basic necessities 
continued to increase at rapid rates, given the vast inequality between the economic situations in 
Serbia versus Bosnia Herzegovina.  
As the evidence suggests, the economic situation within Yugoslavia and Bosnia 
Herzegovina played a major role in the rise of nationalism that occurred between 1989 and 1992. 
It created a sense of frustration amongst the public and an animosity towards a government that 
continued to make promises of saving the country, but never delivered. In addition, the economic 
inequalities split along national lines, such as Croatian and Serbian, also provided an outlet for 
frustrations, and allowing groups to scapegoat and blame for the economic woes Bosnia 
Herzegovina was facing.  
However, the economy alone cannot explain the rise of nationalism. There are a number 
of reasons that H2 falls short. The economic woes present within Bosnia Herzegovina and the 
surrounding regions answers the question of why individuals had grown frustrated with the 
current system. The public watched as their standard of living continued to decline at an ever-
alarming rate as even providing the necessities became impossible for significant segments of the 
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population.106 The government that promised to take steps to improve the situation failed to 
deliver and came to bear a great amount of resentment amongst the public for failing them when 
needed most. This embrace of a new ideological shift is a perfect archetype of the effects of 
decremetal deprivation. However, economic decline alone does not explain a shift in ideology 
towards nationalism. As decremetental deprivation demonstrates, economic decline can increase 
susceptibility for ideological shifts. Nevertheless, that shift did not have to be towards 
nationalism. Any number of shifts could have occurred; the public could have instead directed 
their anger at the state or increased calls for a more socialist state.  The explanation that 
economic woes led to an increase in nationalism is not enough to answer my question because it 
fails at answering the why nationalism component of my research question. All that economic 
woes demonstrate is support for the idea of decremental grievance that prolonged economic 
decline leads to societal frustration and a susceptibility to ideological shifts.  It falls short in 
explain why nationalism was the shift that occurred.  
Media and Economic Decline Hypothesis 
 It is clear from the available evidence that both the elite manipulation of the media and 
the economic decline influenced the situation within Bosnia Herzegovina. However, neither 
media manipulation nor economic grievances were enough on their own to spark the marked rise 
in nationalism. The elite manipulation of the media only explains how nationalism spread and 
economic decline only demonstrates why there was a sense of societal frustration with the status 
quo. I argue that they were both necessary in order for nationalism to rise. The poor economy 
created a public that was responsive to an ideological shift while the elites’ use of the media 
spread of nationalist narratives then provided a new ideology for the public to embrace. Between 
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1989 and 1992, the perfect combination of economic woes and media coverage existed to inspire 
the rise of nationalism. 
 This explanation arose from an interview with a Bosniak woman in Sarajevo. When 
asked about her thoughts on the start of the war and the role of nationalism narratives, she 
responded, “the only reason anyone was listening to the nationalists was because of the 
economy.”107 The nationalist narratives elites were spreading gave the public a focus for their 
general frustration with the situation and someone to blame. If not for the extreme stress caused 
by the inability of individuals to provide for themselves and thrive in the economy, nationalistic 
leaders would have found few followers. In her mind, if the political elite had spread the same 
nationalistic messages during a time when the economy was doing well, they would have fallen 
upon deaf ears.108  
 A Croat woman near Mostar who also saw multiple variables at work in the situation 
echoes this sentiment. She felt “the biggest factor, more than religion or the media, was 
economic interests.”109 In her memories, she remembers a Mostar in which people were 
frustrated economically and saw other ethnicities having greater economic wellbeing than others, 
in particular the perceived discrepancy between Bosniaks and Croats. As a result, “nationalism 
became an excuse.”110 Her observations of the situation support the idea that both the elite 
manipulation and spread of nationalism and economic decline were necessary components. The 
economic decline and the perceived discrepancy between groups created a frustration within 
society. The calls of nationalism, which she refers to as excuses, then allowed those who were 
economically frustrated to latch onto these ideas. If it were not for the spread of these ideas 
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through elite controlled media sources, individuals would have had to find another outlet for the 
blame and anger they were harboring. 
 Newspaper coverage of the economic decline also sought to highlight the role of certain 
nationalities and the victimhood of others. For example, in the coverage of the new (and 
ultimately last) attempt of the Yugoslav government to revive the economy, the paper goes out of 
its way to highlight the nationalities of the politicians responsible for the plan. One such line 
includes “Markovic has brought in a streamlined government of only 19 rather than 29 ministers, 
with key economic posts filled by new, younger faces from the liberal Croatia and Slovenia 
regions.”111 The article then goes on to list by name four important Croatian politicians who have 
been given or retained important political positions. While this article does not directly create a 
sense of blame on the Croatian politicians for the economic decline, it is noteworthy the amount 
of attention that is given to the nationality of these politicians. They are all working for the 
Yugoslavia government, but that receives no mention in the report, only their republic of origin. 
This illustrates yet another way the press was able to subtly highlight the role of ethnicity within 
the Yugoslav political system.  
 In the direct build up to the war, the tensions between the republics and how they were 
portrayed in the media became even more apparent. A striking comparison of how the 
international community reported the events versus how local press presented it demonstrates 
just how manipulated the public perception of events really was. In international coverage of the 
blockades, such as provided by the Japanese based paper The Daily Yomiuri, the blockades are 
presented from an objective view. The article discusses how each republic has played a role in 
the economic decline. Such as “Serbia and Croatia prohibited the export of manufactured goods, 
food, and fuel to Bosnia Herzegovina” or “Serbia used to ship raw materials to Croatia and 
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Slovenia, and received manufactured goods from them in return. But the market relationship has 
ended, and each industry is hurting.”112 The report suggests that all the republics are suffering 
and that the fault should be borne by the political elite who fail to uphold promises to end the 
embargos. However, when local Serbs are asked about the economic situation or who bears 
responsibility and the response is far different. When asked if there is a frustration with the local 
political elite for the state of economy, the answer is a resounding no. As one man told reporters, 
“Milosevic is a hero. He’ll get the support of the whole people if he continues to protect the 
interests of Serbs living in Croatia and Bosnia.”113 Rather than looking at their own political 
leaders as a possible cause of the continued economic decline, many Serbs responded, “This is 
the result of economic pressure by the European Union.”114 As the evidence above suggests, the 
political elite were able to successful convince the public that they were victims of others 
inflicting economic harms against them and that the nationalist politicians were the true heroes 
striving to serve and protect their people. 
 Bosnia bears many similarities in its rise of nationalism to the rise of nationalism in Nazi 
Germany. In both cases, there were intense feelings of economic frustration. This frustration led 
to a confusion of loyalties within society. This economic instability was further aggravated by 
the weakness of political institutions and power struggles amongst the elite.115 In the case of 
Germany, Goldhagen contends that Hitler and his extreme anti-Semitism did not cause Germany 
to commit acts of genocide. Rather, Hitler simply gave the public a scapegoat that they so 
desperately sought for their economic woes. Hitler used his political speeches to spread 
nationalist narratives that excluded the Jews from the sense of being German. They became 
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scapegoats through political rhetoric. In a similar manner, elites used the media within 
Yugoslavia to serve a similar purpose. Whereas Hitler tailored his speeches to blame groups such 
as Jews for the economic catastrophe Germany experienced following WWI, leaders like 
Milosevic were able to blame the various nationalities within the republics of Yugoslavia was the 
declining economic situation.   
 The need for a scapegoat stems from a sense of collective frustration.116 In situations such 
as Bosnia Herzegovina, when social tension reaches a point that disrupts the normal order of 
things, such as the disruption caused by the economic woes, collective identity was disrupted by 
the chaos. As a result, identities within groups become endangered and easily manipulated by 
opportunistic political leaders. When the present government is unable to restore order and a 
sense of collective identity, these new political leaders and their ideologies are able to take seed 
and expand.117 In the context of Yugoslavia this development occurred through a number of 
steps. The radical shift of the economy from controlled to open markets in 1989 and the resulting 
economic failures created intense social tensions. This social tension, and the split along 
economic lines of the various regions of Yugoslavia disrupted the collective identity as 
“Yugoslavs” and instead people began to see themselves as their various nationalities that had 
not previously existed.118 These ideas of separate identities were then spurred on through the 
spread of nationalist narratives that provided a new sense of collective identity among groups 
that had previously been filled with the sense of being Yugoslav. 
 The joint impact of elite manipulation of the media and the economic decline also are 
important for explaining the timing of the rise of nationalism in Bosnia Herzegovina. The 
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presence of both created what could almost be dubbed a perfect storm of circumstances. It was 
essential in the case of Bosnia Herzegovina that economic decline predated the manipulation of 
the media by elites to spread nationalism. From 1985 onwards, there are signs that the economy 
within Yugoslavia is struggling. As early as 1985 there are newspaper articles discussing the 
impending economic crisis. For instance, a special session of the party’s Central Committee was 
called in October of 1985 to deal with the rising inflation and the more than one million 
individuals who were unemployed.119 Yet one does not yet see a strong pressure from elites for 
the media to take on a nationalist focus. It is only after the final attempt to shift to open market 
economics in 1989 that the elites truly begin to embrace the idea of spreading nationalism and 
pressure the media. From this point forward one finds speeches such as Milosevic’s calling for a 
united Serb people or the crackdown against papers that expounded a Yugoslavia identity. This 
order is important because it demonstrates how the economic situation, which began first, 
created amongst the public a general sense of frustration. This frustration could have turned 
against anyone. However, at the same time the economy becomes the worse, there is a concerted 
effort by political elites to focus the attention of the public on nationalism and use other 
nationalities as someone to blame for the frustration they are experiencing. Without first an 
economic decline and then the emergence of elite manipulation of the media, the outcome within 
Bosnia Herzegovina would likely have been much different.  
 Both media and economic woes were necessary conditions for the rise of nationalism in 
Bosnia Herzegovina. The economic situation and its portrayal as falling along national lines 
created an immense social frustration amongst the public. This created an opportunity to disrupt 
allegiance to a united Yugoslavia. As a result, the deliberate spread of nationalist narratives by 
political elites throughout the media found a sympathetic public. Becoming Bosniak, Croatian, 
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Serbian, allowed individuals to regain a sense of belonging that was lost with the collapse of 
Yugoslavia and also to band together against those blamed for their economic woes. As a result I 
contend that H3 is the best explanation for both the rise of nationalism in Bosnia and the timing 
for when it arose.   
Review of Findings 
 All three of my presented hypotheses have merit and offer a different insight into why the 
public in Bosnia Herzegovina embraced nationalism so quickly between 1989 and 1992. H1 
offers important insights into what the majority of individuals attribute the rise of nationalism to; 
the power of the media and nationalist narratives. For instance, as previously discussed, Gellner 
expresses that a nation is something that has to be constructed, and thus nationalist narratives 
worked as a way of building up a sense of collective identity and history within each republic 
where previously individuals had ascribed to a sense of Yugoslav identity. It also offers support 
for scholars such as Fuiji and Powers who argue in support of the power of the media in inciting 
ethnic conflict and tension. However, it falls short of demonstrating why the public was receptive 
to the nationalist messages inundating their press. It simply explains what ideas were present for 
the public to grasp on to, but not why they felt the need to disavow their previous loyalty to 
Yugoslavia. 
 My second hypothesis, examining the role of economic woes, also offers important 
insights and points of support. The case of Bosnia Herzegovina demonstrates strong support for 
Gurr’s ideas of decremental deprivation, given that as the economic situation continued to 
worsen the public’s expectations did not. In addition, the animosity and frustration expressed by 
individuals demonstrates how individuals were dissatisfied with the established system and as a 
result were willing to accept new ideas and plans for improving their situations. The major 
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shortcoming of the economic approach, however, is that it fails to explain why the public chose 
extreme forms of nationalism as the new ideology to embrace. All that the hypothesis supports is 
that there was a desire for something new, but not what that new thing needed to be. Why, for 
instance, did the public embrace calls for nationalism over calling for a strengthened Yugoslavia 
and a return to more controlled markets? It cannot answer that question.  
 My third hypothesis provides the best answer to my original research question of why 
ethnic nationalism gained such strong support in Bosnia Herzegovina. It fulfills the shortcomings 
of the two previous hypotheses. Like H2, it successfully demonstrates how the economic 
situation faced by Yugoslavia and Bosnia Herzegovina, created an atmosphere of intense social 
frustration amongst the public and a sense that the established government had failed the people. 
Unlike the shortcoming of H2 it also provides an explanation for how this dissatisfaction was 
answered. The spread of nationalist narratives through the media provided an ideology for the 
public to rally around when collective senses of identity became shaky. It is also the only one of 
the three hypotheses which is able to explain the timing factor for the rise of nationalism.  
 Overall, while further research is needed to perfect all of the hypotheses, H3 provides the 
best explanation for the rise of nationalism because it is able to answer both the question of why 
the public chose to support nationalism and also why they chose the period between 1989 and 
1992 to make this shift in ideology. 
Future Research 
 The research I have conducted is not perfect. One major area that I would like to delve 
into more and that is necessary in order to strengthen my research is the motivation of elites. 
Why did elites actively seek to raise nationalism within the country and region? This is 
something that I only barely touch on. It would greatly improve my research if I could talk with 
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media staff or media owners to gain an understanding of what their motivators were. Through 
this insight I would be able to suggest with greater certainty the role of the media played and 
what was the incentive for elite manipulation of the media. 
 Applying my hypotheses to cases beyond Bosnia Herzegovina is also something I would 
like focus on with future research. Throughout the world, we see numerous examples of 
economic woes affecting the standard of living in countries. Yet these economic woes do not 
normally shift into sharp ideological shifts that call for violent and exclusionary nationalism. 
Applying the lessons for the Bosnia case to more situations in order to determine if both the 
media and economic woes are required for nationalism to grow would give greater credibility to 
my results. In particular, I would like to look at the situation in Kenya in 2002 and 2007. Kenya 
offers a similar situation to Bosnia Herzegovina in terms of economics, but one does not see the 
same rise in nationalism. It would be a good comparative case study to Bosnia Herzegovina. 
Conclusion 
 Understanding the rise of nationalism within Bosnia Herzegovina will not bring back to 
life the bodies buried in the Olympic stadium, nor will it enable the millions of refugees the wars 
in the Balkan created to return home. Nor can it atone for the thousands of lives lost and the 
millions of dollars spent in efforts to stop the war this nationalism eventually sparked.  That price 
is a cost that Bosnia is still paying and will continue to pay as it struggles to rebuild and recreate 
a society in which Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks can all live peacefully, without animosity towards 
each other. However, that does not mean that there are not important lessons to take away from 
this research.  
 Understanding the variables involved in the rise of nationalism answers important 
questions for the scholarly community. From my research, insights can be gained into how the 
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media is used by political elites to create, perpetuate, and spread nationalist narratives that serve 
their interests and how these narratives are received by the public. Also, analysis of the economic 
situation of Bosnia Herzegovina, and more importantly, the perception of the economy, 
exemplifies how economic upheavals can create systems in which the public become frustrated 
with current status quo institutions and ideologies and seek out leaders or ideologies that promise 
to improve their situations. Finally, analysis that explores the impact of both economic woes and 
nationalist focused press demonstrates the dangers that can arise as a result when a socially 
frustrated public is presented with a supposed solution to their woes, particularly when that 
solution comes at a grave cost to others.   
Through gaining a greater understanding of the role of the media and nationalist 
narratives, the power of economic woes to upset collective identity and the potentially deadly 
mix when both factors align together, the international community can take steps to ensure that 
situations such as what occurred in Bosnia Herzegovina, do not continue to repeat themselves 
around the globe.  
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Appendix 1 
List of Interviews120 
Interview 1 - Bosniak male outside of Mostar, conducted on June 22, 2013 
Interview 2 – Croat woman,121 Mostar, conducted July 19, 2013 
Interview 3 – Serb woman, Sarajevo, conducted August 1, 2013 
Interview 4 – Bosniak woman, Sarajevo, conducted August 2, 2013 
Interview 5 – Bosniak woman, Sarajevo, conducted August 2, 2013 
Interview 6 – Bosniak woman, Sarajevo, conducted August 2, 2013 
Interview 7 – Bosniak woman, Sarajevo, conducted September 22, 2013  
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